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Politics and economy of resilience: EU resilience-building in Palestine and Jordan and its disciplinary governance

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ABSTRACT

This article examines empirical resilience interventions to demonstrate how resilience-building is utilised to govern in non-liberal settings and how its political and economic positionality shapes concrete resilience projects, processes of inclusion and exclusion and the hierarchies between them. It argues that the politics and economy that undergird resilience, coupled with the lack of freedom, render empirical resilience less fit for the purpose of governmentality in non-liberal and authoritarian conditions. In these circumstances, resilience-building governs through discipline. Resilience is structurally oriented towards pinpointed interventions directed at specific targets, subjects and fields. It unfolds as a hierarchal and top-down process, which positions local actors and concerns at the bottom. The inclusion or exclusion of subjects, objects and goals and the hierarchies that underpin empirical resilience are not inherent to specific resilience thinking, but rather derive from unfixed and contingent foreign policy rationalities and instruments. This contingency highlights the indeterminate nature of resilience, which opens space for contestation and decoupling. Resilience's meaning and content are dependent on the dynamics of the foreign policy instruments. The policy-driven nature of resilience intervention renders its theorisation as a difficult challenge.

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1. Introduction

Resilience has become a significant concept in peacebuilding and development processes. This is consistent with broader shifts towards risk management and local enablement in response to the failure of the "Liberal Peace" (Chandler 2012). The EU's adoption of resilience, as a principal foreign and development policy component in 2016, gave it additional significance. It subsequently became a new element in its response to old and new conflicts and security risks in "developing" countries. This article examines empirical resilience interventions to demonstrate how they fit within existing foreign policy frameworks and economic instruments. The discussion focuses primarily on two questions: how does the EU resilience-building govern in non-liberal settings? How does the political and economic positionality of resilience shape interventions and processes of inclusion and exclusion in Palestine and Jordan? EU resilience interventions in

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the Middle East are relevant to this undertaking. In particular, resilience was grafted into the Middle East Peace Process to resolve the Israel-Palestine question, the longest-running conflict in Europe's "southern neighbourhood". It was also deployed to tackle the effects of the Syrian conflict on neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. For reasons of space and significance, I focus on resilience-building in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Jordan. Both are pivotal to the region's politics and conflicts, and are hence likely to remain pertinent to regional and international politics.

Drawing on the Foucauldian literature on practises used to govern societies, I argue that the politics and economy of resilience, coupled with the lack of freedom, render resilience-building less fit for the ambitious and expansive project of governmentality. More important, governmentality is unsuited to explain resilience interventions under non-liberal and authoritarian conditions. Under such conditions, resilience-building is disposed towards discipline rather than governmentality – as the latter operates through free agents. Resilience interventions derive from prior foreign policy rationalities, objectives/frameworks, problematisations and financial instruments. EU foreign policy priorities and existing instruments shaped the content and scope of resilience-building projects. In Palestine and Jordan, these projects were filled with contingent external priorities (counterinsurgency, security, stability, the two-state solution). A critical interrogation of the nexus between resilience and foreign policy is worthwhile because it demonstrates how resilience operates and through what means.

Furthermore, resilience interventions are analytically split between "soft" interventions applied to human subjects and "hard" interventions offered material elements that often sought the maintenance of disciplinary institutions. The examined resilience-building projects demonstrate that resilience is structurally oriented towards pinpointed interventions applied to specific targets, subjects and fields. It unfolds as a hierarchal and top-down process, where local actors and concerns are at the bottom. It should be emphasised that the inclusion or exclusion of subjects, objects and goals and the hierarchies that underpin empirical resilience are not inherent to specific resilience thinking, but instead derive from unfixed and contingent foreign policy rationalities and instruments. This contingency highlights the indeterminacy of resilience, which opens space for contestation and decoupling (Juncos 2018).

Scholarly interest in resilience has generated a wealth of conceptual research on resilience (Chandler 2012, Joseph 2013, Evans and Reid 2014, Pugh 2014, Bourbeau 2015, 2018, Chandler and Reid 2016) and on the EU's approach to resilience in particular (Joseph 2014, Juncos 2017, Anholt and Sinatti 2019, Joseph and Juncos 2019, Cusumano and Hofmaier 2020). However, resilience interventions remain understudied and would benefit from further empirical research. This article contributes to this literature by revealing how resilience-building operates in relation to prior policy and economic frameworks when it is applied in illiberal situations. Furthermore, this article displays how empirical resilience unfolds on the ground and tells us more about the methods, type of interventions and hierarchies they produce and the actors they involve or exclude.

Methodologically, I examine eight EU resilience-building projects. Four are distributed in three geographical areas of the OPT (Area C in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza) and the rest are in Jordan. These projects are selected from the database on the EU Aid Explorer website. To ensure the selection of EU-funded projects, I used the following selection criteria: (1) projects are explicitly titled and dedicated to resilience-building;

(2) the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan are recipients; and (3) EU institutions are donors. The examination of these projects is supported by a critical reading of resilience intervention plans. Discourse analysis methodology is used to conduct a documentary analysis of EU foreign and security policy and related financial instruments, which situates resilience projects within the political rationality and problematisation that undergird them. Discourse is understood as a meaning-producing enterprise that combines both linguistic and material features of representations and practices that make certain subjectification and political outcomes possible (Foucault 1984, 2002). Thus, discursive framings are essential filters to the performativity of resilience interventions.

The article begins with a brief theoretical overview of resilience and the EU's approach to resilience-building. On the basis of this discussion, I develop the analytical framework of government through discipline. The third and fourth sections investigate EU resilience-building projects in Palestine and Jordan. I show that empirical resilience derives from existing foreign policy frameworks, priorities and instruments as a hierarchal process. The final section provides reflections and concluding remarks to explain the implications of the nexus between resilience and foreign policy rationalities and instruments more broadly.

2. Resilience: a theoretical and analytical framework

This section briefly reflects on the accounts that are relevant to the purpose of this article. Resilience is understood differently across the disciplines (Bourbeau 2015, 2018). It initially signified the ability of objects to regain their original form after being exposed to crises and distress. In the 1970s, however, ecology literature reconceptualised resilience as the ability to absorb shocks and adapt to new conditions and continue functioning. With this shift, abnormal circumstances became to be understood as opportunities for adaptation and transformation (Holling 1973, Walker *et al*. 2004). Resilience is widely studied by psychologists; they often concerned themselves with the internal dispositional assets that enable people to recover, adjust and cope with distress and unfortunate circumstances. This approach to resilience seeks to identify and foster those assets to help people overcome adversity and enhance their well-being (Donnon 2010). It is also commonly employed in areas of development and sustainability, security, urban planning and crisis management and reduction (Bourbeau 2013, 2015, Chandler and Coaffee 2017).

Social studies associate resilience with the ontological optic of an uncertain, complex, unpredictable and uncontrollable world. Survival, therefore, requires attending to individuals' subjectivity in a way that enables them to adapt and cope with these conditions (Walker and Cooper 2011, Joseph 2013, Evans and Reid 2014). The discipline of International Relations (IR) developed divergent accounts of resilience to explain its role in international politics. Some IR scholars consider resilience to be a post-liberal, post-interventionist and post-modern form of governance that has evolved in response to new understandings of complexity, while others incorporated it into a critique of liberal peacebuilding in the 1990s (Chandler 2012, 2014, Pugh 2014, Grove and Chandler 2017). Here, resilience is framed as capacity-building interventions that enable and empower subjects to better withstand crises. Advocates of resilience portray it as part of a new regime of thought that seeks to foster locally driven solutions by drawing on local resources (Rogers 2015, EEAS 2016, Tocci 2017, Korosteleva 2019).

Critical scholars present a different account. They tend to conceptualise resilience by looking into the underlying power relations while construing it as a scheme of governance that is inherently bound to governmentality, biopolitics and neoliberalism (Duffield 2010, O'Malley 2010, Walker and Cooper 2011, Duffield 2013, Joseph 2013, Evans and Reid 2014, Chandler and Reid 2016). This account bears out how resilience has infiltrated discourses on development and security while soliciting biopolitical and neoliberal methods that seek to "govern from a distance". And they emphasise the depoliticising nature of resilience by referring to its "nihilistic" ontology (Reid 2012, Evans and Reid 2014, Welsh 2014). Such perspectives have, however, been criticised for their narrow focus, cynical dismissal of resilience as a neoliberal enterprise (Corry 2014, Anderson 2015, Bourbeau 2015) and tendency to overlook its positive potential (Rogers 2015, Bourbeau and Ryan 2018).

This article agrees that resilience is concerned with the government of conduct. However, it questions the analytical fitness of governmentality to explain empirical resilience-building under non-liberal conditions. Discipline and governmentality are divergent tactics of government that produce governing effects on conduct. Governmentality is an overarching mechanism of governance that comprises "the ensemble" of institutions, procedures, reflections, calculations and tactics, and these, in turn, allow the exercise of a "very complex, power that has the population as its target" (Foucault 2007, p. 108). It adopts a totalising power that operates at the macro-level of the population ("the social") to generate self-regulating subjects and social fields by modifying the institutions that run the whole society so that citizens can voluntarily choose to do what they ought to (Dean 2010).

Governmentality governs the conduct sociologically, through the pre-alignment of interests, habits, opinions and inclinations, to fit a particular order and way of living. It thus requires sociological and institutional arrangements that constitute the conditions that produce these interests in the first place (Scott 2005, Foucault 2007). In governmentality, "power is networked and fluid rather than hierarchical and stable" and is less concerned with direct discipline and normalisation (Merlingen 2011, p. 152). Autonomous agency and freedom are "indispensable to governmentality itself" (Foucault 2007, p. 353), which works through free individuals and democratic and representative institutions (Dean 2010).

Theoretically, different features of resilience, and institutional interventions and market solutions in particular, are consistent with the framework of governmentality (Joseph 2013, 2014). But a problem arises as soon as political and economic limitations and non-liberal conditions appear on the scene. The structural limitations of resilience interventions abroad under non-liberal situations result in the narrowing down of their reach and produce a focus on specific subjects and problems that have foreign policy relevance. More importantly, the lack of freedom and autonomous agency renders the logic of governmentality – which essentially operates through free agents – unfit for explaining resilience-building in authoritarian states.

Liberal rule and interventions through illiberal means are common in colonial and neo/post-colonial international orders. This rule operates through obedient subjects and subdued opposition to authority. For liberalism, unfree subjects are "liable to a range of disciplinary, sovereign and other interventions" (Dean 2010, p. 159). As an element of EU foreign policy, which is still influenced by the European imperial and colonial

past (Badarin and Wildeman Forthcoming, Pace and Roccu 2020), resilience-building in the Middle East represents a clear example of liberal interventions that seek to govern the conduct of "non-liberal" subjects through discipline. Discipline is a "micro-technology" of power that produces governing effects through direct action on its subjects by applying focused and pinpointed interventions at the micro-level. Discipline governs in two directions: first, it "increases the force of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)". It "dissociates power from the body … [and] turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which it seeks to increase". The second direction, however, "reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection" (Foucault 1977, p. 138). As a result, discipline transforms its subjects by increasing the efficiency with which they execute particular tasks while diminishing aspects of their political and critical faculties, thereby predisposing them to compliance by "habituating the mind or body to a particular activity … by systematically working upon mental or physical capacities and building these up into discrete abilities" (Scott 2005, p. 34). To do this, discipline divides and differentiates collective entities into "sufficient single units" (Foucault 1977, p. 170).

Although accounts of resilience have different normative and political perspectives, they share a general problematic in which what is at stake is the way through which resilience acts upon its subjects as a practice of power. International organisations have resorted to resilience to redefine their interventions in the Global South. The EU's use of the concept emerged in frameworks of crisis management in two projects in the Horn of Africa (SHARE) and Western Africa (Sahel AGIR) in 2012 (CEC 2009, European Commission 2012, Badarin and Schumacher 2020). Later, during the second revision of the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), resilience travelled into the realms of foreign policy (ENP 2015). Its importance for EU foreign policy was further expanded by the EU Global Strategy, which adopted resilience-building as a foreign policy priority used to address external conflicts, risks and vulnerabilities (EUGS 2016).

The EU presents resilience-building as a set of locally owned and driven interventions that boost "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from stresses and shocks" (European Commission 2012, p. 5). Later, it expanded its conception of resilience as "a broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society" that features "democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the capacity to reform", a "joined-up" approach to address root causes of problems (EUGS 2016, p. 23) and as the European way for peacebuilding abroad. As the former HR/VP of the EU Federica Mogherini argued, resilience-building is "the European way to peace, security and human development" (European Commission 2017a).

As a generator of peace, security and stability, resilience was used to preserve order and stability in neighbouring states that suffered from "fragility" and "chronic vulnerability" following the fallouts of the "Arab Spring" (European Commission 2017b, p. 3). Fragility, from this perspective, became a new threat. It "threatens our [European] interests", and hence, building resilience abroad "benefits us [in Europe]" (EUGS 2016, p. 23), not least because it prevents fragilities and potential crises from spreading and impinging on European security. Accordingly, "[b]uilding more resilient neighbours" is central to the "protection of the EU" (European Commission 2017b, p. 15). Addressing fragile and vulnerable situations around the EU transpired into an essential European interest, as

manifested in peacebuilding and development interventions across the Middle East (Badarin and Wildeman Forthcoming).

As Duffield (2013, 2019) observed, the constant rediscovery of fragility and vulnerability, as elements that are inherent to resilience thinking, was intended to legitimise further interventions focused on monitoring and controlling fragile subjects who were usually considered to be "lacking" and in need of improvement, empowerment and skills to transform them into responsible agents. These liberal–non-liberal power relations undergird resilience interventions in the Global South. Liberalism "regularly expresses the fear that absence of a responsible autonomy" could spread further and cause disorder and instability. There is consequently always the possibility of utilising disciplinary interventions to manage the lives of non-liberal subjects "who do not possess the attributes required to play the city-citizen game", which is the essence of governmentality (Dean 2010, p. 162).

3. Resilience-building in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

This section begins by outlining EU policy and interventions in the OPT since the inception of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo peace process in 1993. This breakthrough generated international momentum for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the two-state solution. International donors, and the EU in particular, invested heavily in this process. The EU followed the political, economic and spatial rationality of the Oslo peace process, which produced an international and consensus on the two-state solution (Badarin 2020a). It has accordingly held that its interventions sought to facilitate the establishment of "an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel", with East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state (EU 2017, p. 28).

The EU focused initially on capacity and institution-building initiatives focused on populated Palestinian towns under Palestinian Authority (PA) or joint control – Areas A and B, as established by the spatial mapping of the Oslo Accords. The rest of the OPT, Area C (approximately 60 per cent of the West Bank), East Jerusalem and Gaza (after 2007), received minimal funding and attention. Meanwhile, Israel intensified its control over, and expansion into Area C and East Jerusalem. The political and material developments on the ground, as well as the Trump Administration's so-called peace plan, known as the "Deal of the Century" or "Peace to Prosperity", have made the two-state solution irrelevant, not least because it rejects the establishment of a *sovereign* Palestinian statehood (The White House 2020). The EU failed to reach a common position on the American plan and to condemn Israel's plans to formally annex large parts of the West Bank – which also threatens Jordan's stability (Badarin 2020b).

Much of this development augurs ill for the EU's policy towards the Middle East and Israel-Palestine. No independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian state can be established without Area C, East Jerusalem and the Gaza. It was, therefore, essential to divert the EU focus into these areas to "preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967" (EUGS 2016, p. 35). This discovery goes back to late 2010, when the "Proximity Talks" between the PA and Israel failed (Badarin 2016). Since 2011, several reports of EU Heads of Mission urged the EU to make long-term development interventions in Area C and East Jerusalem (EU 2011, 2012). Following on from these recommendations, the EU

issued a comprehensive "EU policy for Area C", and this coincided with the EU's deliberation over resilience as a foreign policy priority. In 2016, it adopted the *European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 2017–2020,* which emphasised the "supporting [of] Palestinian resilience" in Area C, East Jerusalem and the Gaza as its core goal (EU 2017, p. 38). The OPT were constituted as a "crisis situation" in the EU action programmes, a necessary background that gives resilience projects the required underpinning and financial resources (European Commission 2018a, p. 28). Let us now turn to resilience projects.

After the 2014 Israeli attack on Gaza, the EU authorised a project entitled: "Building Resilience and Enabling Recovery in Gaza", with a budget of €6 million (European Commission 2019a). It was funded from the "Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace" (IcSP), despite the fact that resilience is not one of its objectives. The IcSP is a contingency tool that is dedicated to quick and flexible responses to "situations of crisis or emerging crisis … to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions" (European Parliament and the Council 2014, p. art.1/4(a)). The rationale of IcSP, especially regarding crisis management, security-related issues, stabilisation and the preservation of the two-state solution, is reflected in this and other projects. Resilience interventions were deployed to "stabilise" Gaza after the Israeli attack in 2014, a human-made "disaster". The selected goals and subjects were attuned to pre-existing foreign policy objectives and instruments. In particular, the project was premised on constituting psychological disturbance among the youth as a threat, and, therefore, pursued the development of detailed micro-activities to discipline them. The interventions not only were applied on the individual level, but were also designed to manage their certain qualities: specifically, the brain, psychology and emotions.

The selection of subjects is based on prior assumptions that insinuate a security dilemma from psychological distress among specific age and socio-economic groups. The project's first component addressed "feelings of frustration and hopelessness" and "psychosocial distress" among students that may "spark further armed conflict". In this manner, students, the victims of the original violence, were profiled as potential aggressors and violent subjects. The psychological threat, which the project aimed to manage, supposedly emanated from "at-risk" and "vulnerable" students, especially over-age and under-achieving students and children. Individual attributes, such as age, grades and mental health and socio-economics attributes, were turned into variables of vulnerability and security threat.

After constituting psychological distress as a threat, the project prioritised emotional management interventions. Over 80 per cent of its budget was spent on the first component (€5.2 million) to finance "soft" activities of emotional discipline that would help govern negative emotions (disenfranchisement, frustration, indignation) through disciplinary arrangements and workshops. Specifically, the project proffered emotion management skills that included "psychological support", "conflict resolution strategies in schools", "human rights education" and "enhance[ing] the employability of at-risk students through market-oriented training" (European Commission 2019a, pp. 4–5). The small remainder of funds was allocated to the second component to tackle "hard" or material aspects of the "crisis" and neutralise the "threat of explosive hazards" after the war (p. 1).

The selection and subjectification of school students and youth was rooted in a security-based rationality. It has been argued that "frustrated youth respond to violence with violence" and are also "more prone to adopting violent responses to stressors" (European Commission 2019a, p. 1). After identifying youth as a source of threat, normative disciplinary measures, such as "conflict resolution", "extra-curricular activities to teach leadership and negotiation" skills, individual or group "counselling sessions" were introduced to "mitigate [their] confrontational tendencies" and "foster [their] civility" (p. 5). This also demanded training and "capacity-building" for counsellors and teachers. "[O]ver-age" and "underachieving" students were especially singled out as the subjects to watch out for and submit to further disciplinary remedies, not least because they were considered to be "particularly vulnerable to the environmental stressors (e.g. food insecurity, poverty, unemployment and unfulfilled potential) that can trigger violent or confrontational responses". Resilience activities were designed to "keep underachieving students positively engaged and productive" (p. 5). In this regard, this project embraced disciplinary measures that target the subjects' mind, psychology and intellectual qualities. What was at stake here was the singling out of situations and subjects of vulnerability that have foreign and security policy relevance. Resilience measures aim to boost students' utility (through social engagement and employability programmes) while diminishing the prospect that their anger will turn into violence, resistance or armed struggle. Rather than dealing with the causes of the "disaster" (military attacks and siege on Gaza), resilience-building directed its interventions at the victims of (Israeli) violence while rendering them as potential aggressors and, hence, security risks and threats to stability.

Another project, "Support to Intra-Palestinian Dialogue and the Resilience of Children and Youths Affected by Conflict" (with a budget of €3.75 million), aimed to "improve current levels of stability" by preventing Palestinian "disruptive behaviour" (European Commission 2019b, p. 1). It assumed that "dire circumstances" in the OPT, coupled with the internal Palestinian political divide, intensified instability and ushered in "unrest and violence" as "channels for venting frustration". The project had two components. The first was congruent with conventional peacebuilding and reconciliation strategies. The target subjects included representatives of businesses, media, municipalities, political factions, trade unions and universities. The project brought these individuals together through workshops, which became forums for interventions and surveillance. At these forums, the project deployed informative and educative activities to develop and disseminate "positive political ideas", "stimulate inclusive reflection and approaches to intra-Palestinian dialogue" and encourage political factions towards "effectively engaging in the reconciliation process" (European Commission 2019b, pp. 1–2). Interventions in the second component resembled those in the first project: they sought to involve children and youth in educational and employability programmes; offered vocational training, awareness-raising within families; and established "counselling hubs" that provided psychological assistance to those affected by "conflict-related shocks".

The discursive and empirical capturing of the subjects in these projects problematised their psychological and intellectual aptitude in a way that internalised into their agency the liability of being "disruptive" and "violent". In this rendering, "vulnerable" agents became a prelude to disorder and security threats and thus pertinent subjects for resilience-building. Disciplinary interventions were applied to survey, track and correct their

internal assets, especially their mental and emotional triggers. This downgraded the victims/targets' political agency and framed their (violent) actions as aimless, a mere reaction to feelings of frustration and venting channels that renders their behaviour a pathological abnormality. This indirectly jettisoned alternative and locally developed interpretations which view these actions as part of a struggle and resistance against colonial domination (Qumsiyeh 2011).

Resilience-building operates over selected subjects that have direct foreign and security policy relevance – certainly not the entire society or "state". It is detail oriented and its main activities are educative. They mediated over specific qualities of selected singular targets (family members, individual students, youth) to boost their capacity to cope with emotions and stress experienced as a result of Israeli military violence. To this end, the projects proffered disciplinary attempts to control emotions and anger and sought to diminish violent backlash and resistance. These soft interventions warranted behavioural discipline that works in two directions. First, technical and educative empowerment that seeks to educate selected subjects on how to deal with their emotions in "correct" manners while coping with the status quo of domination. Second, depoliticisation of the emotional effects of Israeli violence, and diverting Palestinians away from the struggle against colonialism. It is worth noting that resilience interventions in these projects are at odds with psychologists' understanding of resilience, which is driven by individuals' needs and well-being (Donnon 2010, Bourbeau 2015, 2018). Meanwhile, EU psychological resilience-building is inherently policy-oriented and security-oriented. Rather than being concerned with victims' well-being per se, it securitises their distress as a threat. The goal of managing and controlling emotions is to safeguard order and quiet, although this ultimately ends up enabling suffering in silence. The victims are encouraged to manage their emotions and traumas internally, within the bounds of their bodies. The order that resilience-building pursues comes at the expense of the victims whose security is continually violated.

A third project, "Support to Sustainable Economic Development and Enhanced Governance", targeted Gaza and Area C (European Commission 2018a, Annex 2). It also had two components. The first, *Enhancing Gaza economic resilience 2018–2019*, dealt with the "most vulnerable" groups in Gaza (p. 7) and sought to develop particular economic niches (especially agriculture) to boost exports from Gaza to the West Bank and Israel. The project aspired to achieve "stronger market links" through "more competitive business practices" (European Commission 2018a, p. 23, Annex 2). The EU delegated the project's activities to several external and local organisations, as well as representatives from different EU countries such as Denmark, France and the UK. Curiously, the inclusion or exclusion of local actors followed ideological and prior political edicts which sanctioned empowerment of the so-called "moderate" Palestinian actors and marginalised and banned contact with the so-called "radical" actors, such as Hamas and other Palestinian organisations (Council of the EU 2009). Accordingly, the PA-run Ministry of National Economy was included as a "stakeholder" while Hamas, which governs Gaza internally, was excluded and regarded as part of the problem.

The second component was devoted to Area C. The UN-Habitat and the PA-run Ministry of Local Government (MLG) were included as partners. The latter's role was, however, restricted to technical and advisory input during "discussions for the preparation of the spatial-economic interventions at the individual and cluster levels" (p. 8).

This component had three objectives: The first was strengthening the "economic resilience of vulnerable economic groups" by building "stronger market links and more competitive businesses practice"; the second was boosting "the competitiveness of the industrial sector" through "sustainable energy solutions". (This remained in the realm of rhetoric as the West Bank is entirely dependent on Israeli energy supplies and Gaza is afflicted by an acute energy crisis, which has been regularly abetted by non-EU funding and fuel supplies (Reuters 2020).) The third objective sought to provide "access to a better justice system and increased protection of human rights" (European Commission 2018a, p. 18, Annex 2).

While the first component (in Gaza) excluded Hamas on the grounds it was part of the problem, the second (in the West Bank) component was coordinated with the Israeli authorities. In terms of concrete (material) activities, this component focused on the spatial planning and mapping of land rights and ownership, improving the capacity of the local institutions to deliver basic services (education, health, energy, water) and enhancing Area C infrastructure (improving roads, public buildings, wastewater) (p. 19). The targets and goals were oriented towards the micro-level. Targets were generally selected on the basis of their degree of vulnerability, market potential and geographic location. This project evidently sought to delegate and divide labour between diverse local and external actors. Moreover, resilience-building is utilised to influence existing conditions and steer them into a particular direction without aspiring to alter the structures of domination (such as the Israeli siege on Gaza and the de facto annexation of Area C that threatens the Palestinian existence there). Instead, resilience-building suggests "enhanc[ing] dialogue with COGAT" (the Coordinator of [Israeli] Government Activities in the OPT), information-sharing with Israeli authorities, increased flexibility and the adjustment of goals and targets to accommodate structural as well as contingent Israeli measures (European Commission 2018a, pp. 12–13, Annex 2).

In Jerusalem the focus of resilience is intimately tied to the maintenance of the two-state solution. This is evident in the two objectives of the project "Support to East Jerusalem in 2018–2020" (European Commission 2018b Annex 3). The first "specific" objective seeks to preserve "the Palestinian character" of East Jerusalem, which serves the second and "overall" political objective of "maintain[ing] the viability of the two-state solution, with Jerusalem as the capital of two states" (European Commission 2018b, p. 11. Annex 3). The beneficiaries are selected from the "vulnerable" Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, especially children, youth, women and those whose fundamental rights have been violated (p. 5). The stakeholders include local and international NGOs, International Organisations and the remaining Palestinian organisations in East Jerusalem.

This project, too, employed "soft" interventions to support normative, education, economic and social fields. The normative field was directed towards the "rule-of-law" that empirically unfolded as legal assistance for human rights activists. Interventions in education focused on increasing access to schools, reforming teaching methods, reducing the dropout rate and providing vocational training. Economically, the project sought to encourage tourism, improve employability and competitiveness and promote entrepreneurship and start-up businesses. The social component dealt with drug prevention and abuses and encouraged cultural activities that reflected the Palestinian identity and heritage in East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, hard or material support was limited to certain financial measures that facilitated citizens' access to loans that would finance

the renovation of their homes; it also offered financial assistance to restore historical sites in the city (European Commission 2018b, pp. 12–13, Annex 3). While the project expanded the "soft" elements, it offered only minimal scope for establishing material elements (e.g. restoration of houses and historical sites, provision of solar panels) that do not affect artefacts that have been altering the Palestinian character of Jerusalem (B'Tselem 2019). Curiously, resilience interventions targeted on Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem did not explicitly focus on security, unlike those implemented in the West Bank and Gaza. This was because East Jerusalem is excluded from existing security arrangements (between Israel, the PA, the EU and the US) in the West Bank and Gaza (Badarin 2016).

It helps to close this section with two remarks. The first is the deficiency of resilience-building to resist Israeli domination. Drawing on the notion of "resilience-as-maintenance" (Bourbeau 2013), EU resilience-building in Palestine is used instrumentally to preserve the status quo in one direction. It is designed to uphold the Palestinian status quo without impeding Israel's domination and settler-colonial expansion. Resilience-building that seeks to achieve quiet and stability by eviscerating resistance and maintaining the status quo of one side is doomed to fail in the face of dogged and well-equipped Israeli settler-colonial policies that seek to alter the physical, demographic and social conditions in Palestine. These policies are the core threat to Palestinian resilience. Furthermore, as the two-state solution has eroded, the EU has adjusted its rhetorical tone and begun to construct its interventions as contributing "towards the establishment" of a Palestinian State (European Union 2017, p. 3) and has shifted its focus to "service delivery to Palestinians, particularly to the most vulnerable" (EU 2017, p. 12).

The second point is about the hierarchical character of resilience-building, and specifically its externalised and "top-down" approach to the planning and implementation of resilience interventions. Besides being the outcome of EU foreign policy priorities and instruments, the EU has also commissioned non-local actors to implement interventions. Examples include the institutions of EU Member States (e.g. DFID, the Norwegian Refugees Centre), European organisations (e.g. Forward Thinking, a UK-based charity), UN Agencies (e.g. WHO, UNRWA and UN-Habitat) and international organisations (e.g. Oxfam, Première Urgence Internationale and Save the Children) (European Commission 2020). Local actors and organisations may only enter the equation in the third instance, usually as subcontractors operating under the supervision of external actors. This is not to question the competence of these actors, but rather to show the hierarchy of a resilience-building that renders an externally driven top-down process that implies domination rather than empowerment.

4. Resilience-building in Jordan

As an ENP-member state, the EU-Jordan relationship is governed by several frameworks such as the ENP, the Association Agreement and Partnership Priorities (Schumacher and Bouris 2018). The latter is of particular relevance here because it provides insights into the underlying concerns that guided the EU's interventions in Jordan during this period. These contingent priorities, as the time span indicates, included selected security issues (especially counter-terrorism and radicalisation), economic stability and micro-finance, immigration/refugees and border management (European Commission 2016). EU resilience-building projects in Jordan have generally reproduced these priorities.

Under the umbrella of "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism" (STRIVE), the EU deployed three resilience-building projects in Jordan between 2016 and 2018 that had a total budget of €9.379 million (EU Aid Explorer 2019a). As in Palestine, the situation in Jordan was constructed to fit the prior conditions of EU foreign policy and financial instruments. Jordan was consequently classified as "a crisis situation" because it borders conflict-ridden zones in Syria and Iraq. Certain groups in Jordan were considered to be at risk and "vulnerable to radicalisation", and this was held to institute a situation of "urgency" that required the authorisation of funds for resilience-building interventions (European Commission 2015, pp. 2, 6). This construction permitted the extraction of financial resources from the IcSP, and the profound structural dependency meant that resilience-building was conducted in a responsive and ad hoc manner to come to terms with specific foreign policy priorities. The following discussion will now demonstrate this.

The project "Youth Advancement for Peaceful and Productive Tomorrow", which sought to combat the "radicalisation and extremism" of youth (15–25 years of age), was deployed in Jordan. At its core, this project was driven by security considerations. It posited that the high number of Syrian refugees in Jordan burdened the Jordanian economy and diminished the government's ability to cater to the basic needs of its citizens. This burden was held to engender security risks because violent and extremist groups prey on socio-economically disadvantaged subjects for recruitment. Framed against this background, the project sought to prevent radicalisation by helping vulnerable youth and communities to become socially "engaged" through activities like "recreational and socio-cultural opportunities, mentoring, accompaniment and psychological support" (European Commission 2015, p. 1).

These activities unfolded through three main interventions. First, "Community Action Hubs" were established and tasked with countering terrorism. They provided sites for producing local agents to enforce discipline by offering training to coaches, mentors and parents focused on stress and conflict management and identifying and correcting signs of radicalisation. But more importantly, they served as platforms for socialisation, surveillance and information gathering and sharing. The second intervention, entitled "Improving Youth Wellbeing" sought to counter extremist narratives and hate speech. It provided "skills workshops" (to about 1200 youth), psychological and social support (to about 350 youth), "civic consultations" (200 youth), psychological and self-expression sessions "civic participation" sessions and "community service" and "information literacy" campaigns.

The third component targeted parents and caretakers and offered them "awareness-raising sessions" on how to counter-extremism and help those "at risk" of being radicalised. The project expanded on "soft" aspects to adjust the behavioural conduct of the subjects so that they become more socially "engaged" and "civil". Meanwhile, material interventions were restricted to "small-scale" construction and the rehabilitation of public facilities such as sports halls, libraries and civic centres (European Commission 2015, pp. 1–6). The project anticipated a range of disciplinary effects. Youth participants were expected to "demonstrate improved psychological well-being, constructive social behaviours and productively engaged in inclusive community development". Parents and caretakers were taught and disciplined into identifying radicalisation symptoms and risk factors among family members (European Commission 2015, p. 6).

Furthermore, the project was built on narrow socio-economic understandings that associate unemployment and social disenfranchisement with Syrian refugees. The high number of refugees in Jordan has undoubtedly augmented the socio-economic burden on the state and society. But economic stagnation, uneven development and unemployment have been chronic problems since the 1990s due to the fact that Jordan's policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation have been implemented without political liberalisation, resulting in slower economic growth, deteriorating living standards, a shrinking middle-class and high poverty and unemployment levels (Harrigan *et al*. 2006, Ryan 2011, Awad 2019, El-Anis 2019). For example, before the Syrian conflict, the ability of Jordan's economy to create jobs was in decline, and shrunk by 20 per cent in four years (Phenix for Sustainable Development 2018, p. 4). It is important to note that Jordan has adopted nationality-based preferential access to the labour market that bars refugees from employment in specific sectors (Phenix for Sustainable Development 2018).

The EU entrusted Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian organisation, to implement the project, which then sub-contracted certain activities to local NGOs (e.g. Debate Foundation in Amman). Mercy Corps had stepped up its activities in Jordan since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. There are points of intersection between the EU's and Mercy Corps' understanding of resilience. The latter operationalises the standard EU conception of resilience into empirical activities that seek to put people on a "pathway to self-reliance" through soft measures, such as education initiatives, employability activities, psychological support and training, in addition to other "community-led and market-driven" interventions (Mercy Corps 2020). As an example of resilience-building intervention, a "Nature Club" was organised to enable youth, and especially Syrian refugees in Jordan, to engage with recreational activities such as hiking and climbing. This was part of a psychological strategy that would help to "manage" their stress and build their "resilience, so they [would be able to] choose a productive path forward" (Mercy Corps 2019). This project focused on educative and disciplinary undertakings to promote self-reliance through training and market-driven employability skills. However, since the project creates no job vacancies for these skills, it is questionable if it will help to reduce the country's unemployment rate and address other chronic socio-economic challenges.

The EU approved another resilience intervention to combat radicalisation by providing direct assistance to Jordanian disciplinary institutions. The project, "Technical Assistance to Support the Government of Jordan to Prevent Violent Extremism", was considered to an "exceptional" measure with a €4.5 million budget that was commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a German corporate (development body) that provides services in the development and educational fields (European Commission 2020, p. 94). According to its online profile, GIZ's (n.d.) activities are designed to "promote a market-oriented, ecological and social economic order".

This project aimed to "develop actionable understanding of drivers, methods, trends of radicalisation and recruitment in Jordan through quantitative and qualitative field research". It promised to build Jordan's capacity to "address society-wide radicalisation trends and disengage, rehabilitate, and reintegrate radicalised persons, including returning fighters" (European Commission 2015, p. 5). Generally, the project was mainly concerned with providing "technical assistance" to the Jordanian Ministry of Interior to help it formulate a general policy of engagement with "vulnerable" sections and

communities to prevent their members from being radicalised. The main activities consisted of "soft" interventions and the conducting of research and fieldwork that would generate knowledge on radicalisation and recruitment in Jordan. This knowledge production was necessary to correct behaviour and discipline targeted subjects into "civil" and "non-radical" ways of living. Another activity focused on narrative analysis of extremist groups and their critics in Jordan, and it sought to educate the Ministry of Interior on how to analyse these narratives (European Commission 2015).

A following project, "Equipment and Renovation of Facilities", allocated €1 million to improve the Jordanian Ministry of Interior's disciplinary institutions. In seeking to "strengthen [Jordan's] resilience to violent extremism", it provided material support to boost the efficiency of the Jordanian security sector by improving its detention facilities and supply equipment (EU Aid Explorer 2019b). The EU outsourced implementation and procurement tasks to the UN Office for Project Service (UNOPS) (European Commission 2020, p. 97). A similar EU project ("Reinforcing Jordan's capabilities at the Eastern Borders", which had a budget of €6 million) followed in 2019 and sought to provide material support to the security sector. France Expertise, a French corporate organisation, was selected to implement the project (European Commission 2020, p. 246). Since 2017, it had presented itself as a specialist actor in "stabilisation and resilience" that was committed to "stabilise regions in situations of crisis and fragility" (France Expertise 2017). This intervention involved the construction of a "logistic hub" for the Eastern Command of the Armed Jordanian Forces (AJF) at the strategic airbase in Ruwaished near the Syrian border. The main aim was to bolster AJF's "capability to respond to any threats … [that are] likely to hamper Jordan's security (terrorist infiltration, weapon and drug smuggling)". It was believed this hub would increase the security sector's ability to respond to threats by, for example, hindering "terrorist infiltration" and weapon smuggling from and to Syria and Iraq (Jordan Times 2019, European Commission 2019c).

Resilience-building in Jordan was generally guided by pre-existent political and security priorities and the rationale of tapped financial instruments. The situation in Jordan was reconstructed to fit the IcSP's criteria to permit the release of funds. The bulk of the activities focused on "soft" interventions in the form of educational and disciplinary measures directed towards specific objectives and subjects (see the aforementioned projects, which focused on recreational activities, socialisation activities, psychological assistance, skill development and vocational training). However, they were not accompanied by material interventions that would create new job vacancies. Resilience-building did, however, provide material interventions, albeit on a smaller scale, that were mainly directed to specific security objectives and disciplinary institutions, such as a military base, the renovation of prisons and the provision of equipment to the Ministry of Interior. These resilience-building interventions unfolded as a "top-down" process, in diametric opposition to the EU's representation of resilience as "bottom-up" and locally owned and led. While the politics and economy of EU foreign policy was determined by the overall content and objectives of these interventions, implementation was delegated to external actors, including profit-driven corporates. While foreign organisations and corporates (Mercy Corps, GIZ, UNOPS, France Expertise) preside at the helm of resilience-building, local actors are subcontracted on the second-hand or third-hand rung of the hierarchy of authority.

5. Concluding remarks

I attempted, in this article, to synthesise how resilience unfolds through concrete interventions. Understandably, the thread that connects these projects is that they all grew out of EU foreign policy, financial instruments and political frameworks towards target countries. It stands to reason that resilience-building is governed by the internal logic of these schemes. Despite its centrality to the EU foreign policy, resilience lacks dedicated financial instruments. The IcSP is the principal instrument used to finance resilience, even though resilience was not originally among its objectives. It is premised on stability and security, and is usually tapped to fund urgent responses to crises, conflicts and security threats. This "political economy" shapes the content of resilience-building.

To justify a flexible use and fund disbursement, the EU projected the "crisis situation" externally, in this case onto Palestine and Jordan. This representation did not necessarily correspond to local understandings or objective reality. After all, Jordan does not consider itself to be in a crisis situation, but rather as being affected by external crises (e.g. the Kuwait, Iraq, financial and Syrian crises). Jordan is considered to be a stable and secure country that has even outlived the Arab Spring (Kumaraswamy 2019). It is equally inappropriate to construe the situation in the OPT as a "crisis", not least because this suggests a temporary status and, by definition, an Israeli occupation that has lasted for over half-a-century cannot be qualified by these terms. As revealed earlier, resilience-building did not only leave the permanency of Israel's domination and colonial facts unchallenged, but actually incorporated these elements into its operation. The fact remains that EU capacity-building, including resilience, arrangements have "coexisted with the operative [Israeli] colonial structure instead of bringing it to a close" (Badarin 2015, p. 159).

A crisis is projected and vulnerability and fragility are ascribed with two purposes in mind. One is to imply a sense of risk that demands urgent action. Vulnerabilities are presented as verifiable traits common in "developing" nations that are demanded to act resiliently (Evans and Reid 2014, p. 22). The classification of subjects as lacking in "civility" and "social engagement" is a liberal ontological assumption that presents the "Other" as always in "need [of] normative improvement" (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė 2006, p. 17) which permits disciplinary interventions to manage non-liberal subjects' lives. They are, therefore, required to undergo resilience-building and be equipped with skills that will enable them to live and "manage in [their] natural habitat the risks posed by underdeveloped life" (Duffield 2010, pp. 63, 67). The second purpose relates to the internal operation of existing instruments and release of funds and resources for resilience-building.

Security, stability and funding instruments have been relatively fixed variables throughout the above projects. However, the nature of security concerns and spots of vulnerability varied. For instance, the two-state solution vision and the different security and governing arrangements in the OPT played dominant roles in shaping resilience interventions and the selection of subjects. There was subsequently more focus on Area C and a tendency to embed security-laden interventions in some areas (in the West Bank and Gaza) but not in other areas (East Jerusalem). This reflected a desire to preserve the two-state solution. In Jordan, however, resilience is mainly operated as a counter-insurgency/terrorism/radicalisation mechanism.

Critical scholars conceptualise resilience in terms of neoliberalism and governmentality. This article does not dismiss this interpretation, but rather qualifies it and clarifies the limits

of its explanatory power. Although neoliberalism and other normative codes are discernible in resilience-building projects, their persistence owes to the EU's "structural foreign policy", which is inherently premised on the transfer of norms, including neoliberal economics (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, Holden 2016). Zooming further into resilience-building dynamics displays that its politics and economy, coupled with a lack of freedom, render resilience-building dynamics unfit for the expansive project of governmentality (or "governing from a distance") in non-liberal and authoritarian states. Both governmentality and discipline are tactics of government. Whereas the former focuses on macro-tactics and operates through the population of free individuals, the latter is concerned with micro-interventions and actively acts on its subjects. In the absence of free subjects to govern through, resilience relies on discipline. This, however, does not mean that the EU does not pursue governmentality ambitions in other settings by, for example, targeting entire police apparatuses in post-conflict situations (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė 2006).

The EU already has situational knowledge and experience of deploying disciplinary micro-techniques (İşleyen 2018) and technocratic interventions (Tartir and Ejdus 2018) towards training the Palestinian police in population governance. The above projects demonstrate the significance of discipline in the EU's resilience-building interventions. They are structurally oriented towards pinpointed interventions that are focused on a smaller number of subjects and operate as a top-down process. Interventions operated over single units: selected students, youth, teachers, parents, refugees, community and security personnel (who are concerned with counter-terrorism and radicalisation), as well as community facilities and institutions used by these subjects. This is attributable to pre-determined and contingent policy objectives, frameworks and financial instruments and available expertise and logistical resources.

Resilience interventions were also directed at disciplinary institutions such as army facilities, government ministries (e.g. Ministry of Interior), prisons, psychological clinics/hubs and schools. On the one hand, subjects were discouraged from turning psychological distress into violence/resistance, outward migration or radicalisation. On the other hand, interventions sought to increase subjects' aptitude to carry out certain security-ridden activities, manage their emotions and "foster [their] civility". They also sought to enhance employability and keep subjects "positively engaged and productive" and de-radicalised. In this way, resilience workshops and other arrangements provided social sites for normalisation that would hone subjects' "civility" and regulate and fill their empty time (especially unemployed subjects) with activities that would keep them away from an unmonitored and potentially radical life. They also provided platforms for surveillance and information-gathering activities that are, as Foucault observed, essential to knowledge production and its mobilisation to govern the conduct of the targeted. This is achieved both through subtle power (de-radicalisation, education, emotional and psychological management, skilling and training) and the application of more forceful procedures (including torture which is a common practice in Palestine and Jordan) available to the security sector or incarceration facilities.

The critical examination of the resilience-foreign policy nexus reveals how resilience operates and through what means. It is important to underline that the inclusion or exclusion of subjects, objects and goals, along with the hierarchies that underpin empirical resilience, is not inherent to a specific resilience-thinking, but instead derives from unfixed foreign policy priorities and instruments. This unfixity and replaceability renders resilience

as an unstable and contestable enterprise. Besides being influenced by the hierarchy of political priorities, it unfolds as a "top-down" process that relegates local actors and concerns. It starts with the EU outlining the political/financial rationality, targets, objectives and desired outcomes of resilience interventions, and then commissioning implementation to non-local actors. This hierarchical ordering is another consistent feature of the projects that were engaged.

Resilience-building encompasses "soft" (educative) and "hard/material" interventions. Although the former is more prevalent than the latter, both aspects were applied carefully on selected targets (military bases, parents, prisons/prisoners, refugees, students and teachers). This imbalance between soft and material interventions is contingent on contextual and policy factors. For instance, resilience-building in Jordan deployed more funds for material interventions into disciplinary institutions such as building a military base, enhancing prisons and providing equipment and know-how to the security sector. Resilience as a concept and practice cannot explain the selection of actors, funding sources, goals and targets. Instead, targets and situations of crises or vulnerability have to be discursively constructed in the first place as a foreign and security policy concern. This is precisely because resilience-building is policy-driven, and, therefore, its agents, goals, instruments and objects remain acutely unfixed.

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